My brothers and sisters in Christ, last week we
started publishing this text and we continue today. U.S. Bishops teach us that
we must form our conscience well, so in reading this text can get well ideas to
form our conscience ■ Fr Agustín, Pastor.
4. If I
think that a pro-abortion candidate will, on balance, do much more for the
culture of life than a pro-life candidate, why may I not vote for the
pro-abortion candidate? If a political candidate supported abortion, or any
other moral evil, such as assisted suicide and euthanasia, for that matter, it
would not be morally permissible for you to vote for that person. This is
because, in voting for such a person, you would become an accomplice in the
moral evil at issue. For this reason, moral evils such as abortion, euthanasia
and assisted suicide are examples of a “disqualifying issue.” A disqualifying
issue is one which is of such gravity and importance that it allows for no
political maneuvering. It is an issue that strikes at the heart of the human
person and is non-negotiable. A disqualifying issue is one of such enormity
that by itself renders a candidate for office unacceptable regardless of his
position on other matters. You must sacrifice your feelings on other issues
because you know that you cannot participate in any way in an approval of a
violent and evil violation of basic human rights. A candidate for office who
supports abortion rights or any other moral evil has disqualified himself as a
person that you can vote for. You do not have to vote for a person because he
is pro-life. But you may not vote for any candidate who supports abortion
rights. Key to understanding the point above about “disqualifying issues” is
the distinction between policy and moral principle. On the one hand, there can
be a legitimate variety of approaches to accomplishing a morally acceptable
goal. For example, in a society’s effort to distribute the goods of health care
to its citizens, there can be legitimate disagreement among citizens and
political candidates alike as to whether this or that health care plan would
most effectively accomplish society’s goal. In the pursuit of the best possible
policy or strategy, technical as distinct (although not separate) from moral
reason is operative. Technical reason is the kind of reasoning involved in
arriving at the most efficient or effective result. On the other hand, no
policy or strategy that is opposed to the moral principles of the natural law
is morally acceptable. Thus, technical reason should always be subordinate to
and normed by moral reason, the kind of reasoning that is the activity of
conscience and that is based on the natural moral law.
5. If I may not vote
for a pro-abortion candidate, then should it not also be true that I can’t vote
for a pro-capital punishment candidate? It is not correct to think of abortion and
capital punishment as the very same kind of moral issue. On the one hand,
direct abortion is an intrinsic evil, and cannot be justified for any purpose
or in any circumstances. On the other hand, the Church has always taught that
it is the right and responsibility of the legitimate temporal authority to
defend and preserve the common good, and more specifically to defend citizens
against the aggressor. This defense against the aggressor may resort to the
death penalty if no other means of defense is sufficient. The point here is
that the death penalty is understood as an act of self-defense on the part of
civil society. In more recent times, in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae, Pope
John Paul II has taught that the need for such self-defense to resort to the
death penalty is “rare, if not virtually nonexistent.” Thus, while the Pope is
saying that the burden of proving the need for the death penalty in specific
cases should rest on the shoulders of the legitimate temporal authority, it
remains true that the legitimate temporal authority alone has the authority to
determine if and when a “rare” case arises that warrants the death penalty.
Moreover, if such a rare case does arise and requires resorting to capital
punishment, this societal act of self-defense would be a *morally good action*
even if it does have the unintended and unavoidable evil effect of the death of
the aggressor. Thus, unlike the case of abortion, it would be morally
irresponsible to rule out all such “rare” possibilities a priori, just as it
would be morally irresponsible to apply the death penalty indiscriminately ■
(This text will continue next week)
